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Abolish the Article 9 Filing System
Peter A. Alces*
Who breaks a butterfly upon a wheel?

-Alexander Pope 1

Because the filing system is the very basis of the personal
property security law in our economy, failure of the filing system
would undermine the complex, often subtle interaction of policies, interests, and equities vouchsafed by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Succinctly, if the filing system fails,
Article 9 fails. 2 Incongruities in the design and operation of the
filing system produce results inimical to the object of secured
credit and make it worthwhile to revisit the place of the filing
system in the Article 9 scheme and the consequences of the system's deficiencies.3 If we expect too much of the filing system, or
believe that we can accomplish too much through its reform, the
object of Article 9 may be frustrated.
I start by trying to imagine the world of secured transactions without the Article 9 filing system. Let me make clear: I
do not imagine a world without secured transactions; 4 I do not
imagine a world in which secured parties would have to publish
* Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary. I am indebted to Professor David Frisch for his insightful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. ALEXANDER POPE, EPISTLE To DOCTOR ARBUTHNOT (1734), reprinted in
COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF ALExANDER POPE 176, 180 (Henry W. Boynton
ed., 1903).
2. See Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc. v. Tabenken (In re Brawn), 7 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 565, 575 (D. Me. 1970) ("It is most improbable that [Article 9's] sponsors anticipated the extent to which secured credit under the...
Code would be jeopardized by the errors and omissions of secured parties in
satisfying the simple requirements of a sufficient financing statement."), quoted
in William C. Hillman, What's in a Name: The U.C.C. Filing System in the
Courts, 44 OELA. L. REv. 151, 159 n.65 (1991).
3. See James J. White, Revising Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litigation,
26 Loy. L.A. L. Rnv. 823 (1993).
4. A number of articles have reviewed the economic arguments for and
against secured credit in some depth. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony
T. Kronman, Secured Financing and PrioritiesAmong Creditors, 88 YALE L.J.
1143 (1979); Alan Schwartz, The ContinuingPuzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND.
L. REv. 1051 (1984); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests in Bankruptcy Priorities:
A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL SUD. 1 (1981).
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in newspapers their memoranda claiming a collateral interest in
a debtor's assets; I do not imagine a world without Twyne's
Case.5 I just try to think of a commercial world without filing
and then make the case for a filing system ab initio. That is, if
there were no filing system, would someone have to invent it?
What would the invention look like?
To answer that question, we must first decide what we want
the filing system to do. Toward this end, this Article examines
two different models of the filing system: the informational, bulletin board model and the claim-staking model. According to the
bulletin board model, the filing system serves as a source of information for interested parties to learn about the finances of
debtors. Most obviously, it allows prospective secured creditors
to learn to what degree a debtor has encumbered her assets. According to the claim-staking model, the filing system is, above all
else, a means for secured creditors to stake their claims to the
debtor's assets. This Article criticizes the informational model
and builds on the claim-staking model.
Claim-staking lies at the heart of the filing system's rationale, but claim-staking alone is insufficient. Creditors not only
want to stake their claims; they also need to know the status of
their claims, i.e., whether they have staked their claims in a way
that a court will recognize. In short, creditors need to verify
their claims.
Perversely, the present filing system makes it easy to stake
a claim, but makes verification expensive and uncertain. The
verifying creditor typically will hire an attorney who tells a
paralegal to request financing statements from various filing offices. From the returned filing statements, the attorney theoretically can determine where her client would stand in the priority
line provided she files in a correct manner. In essence, the present filing system creates huge expense for creditors by requiring
them to obtain uncertain opinions on priority.
I propose we remove the need for attorney opinions on priority. State officials should dispositively determine priority among
secured creditors. By enabling secured parties to obtain such
5. 3 Coke Rep. 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601). The case involved a debtor's preferential, and fraudulent, transfer of assets just prior to the
issuance of a writ of execution against the debtor. The debtor had remained in
possession of the "transferred" property after the conveyance in form. That "ostensible ownership" problem informed the arguments in favor of extending the
filing system offered by Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson. See Douglas G.
Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership:An Examinationof the
Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175, 179-96 (1983).

ABOLISH FILING

1995]

certain determinations of priority, this reform would eliminate
uncertainty and thereby reduce cost.
Part I of this Article describes the failures of the current
filing system and portends an even more bleak future: The
problems with the current system may well be exacerbated
rather than corrected by developing technologies and law revision initiatives. 6 Part I1 then considers our ambitions for the
system. The existence of the competing informational and
claim-staking models demonstrates that there is not perfect
agreement on our aspirations for Article 9 filing. It is necessary
to discern some common interest before we can posit a system
that will serve that interest. Part III begins with a vision of the
filing system, a theory of filing. It then builds on this theory by
developing my proposal that state filing offices determine priority. I conclude that by reformulating the role of the state filing
office and the debtor in order to better provide for creditors' verification needs, relatively minor adjustments to the status quo
would make the filing system more reliable and save billions of
dollars.
I.

THE FLAWS OF THE STATUS QUO

Because virtually all secured obligations are satisfied without the secured party's recourse to collateral, even if the current
system were completely dysfunctional, even if no filing were
properly indexed and no search revealed prior filings, loans secured by personal property collateral would still usually be satisfied. 7 Also, it would be prohibitively difficult to determine the
number of fatally deficient filings now littering the local and central filing offices of this country. In any event, after five years,
6. Although the introduction of more sophisticated technology in this area
of the law could be a very good thing, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Computerizationof
the Article 9 FilingSystem: Thoughts on Buildingthe ElectronicHighway, LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1992, at 5, 6, if that increased technological sophistication is not coordinated among the filing venues, a net savings may not
be realized. Although the cost savings effected by the proposal described in this
Article would need to be compared with the revised filing system rather than
just the status quo, proposed adjustments to the filing system may not in fact
reduce attorneys' fees significantly. In any event, the drafiers of the revision
have not offered any data to establish a net reduction in attorneys' fees attributable to filing system compliance. The issue remains largely ignored.
7. That observation leaves aside, for the moment, the fact that many secured loans would not be made in the first place were it not for the assumed
integrity of the current system.
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the good as well as the bad filings generally go away s (even
though they may not be purged from the records). 9
Because most debtors do not go into bankruptcy, there is no
meddlesome trustee running a fine-tooth comb through the filing records. Thus, the secured party's failure to file in the right
place or under the correct debtor's name matters no more than
the tree's falling in the middle of a forest. It is necessary,
though, to appreciate what can (and does) go wrong in order to
understand what secured parties and their counsel must do to
avoid frustration of their expectations.
In the last few years, the Article 9 filing system has been
the subject of considerable study. An American Bar Association
Task Force1 0 surveyed the filing practices of search services and
state and local filing offices. 11 The Task Force also devoted some
attention to the costs of the current system, as well as to emerging technological developments that might impact the evolution
of the system. The work of the Task Force resulted in the development of several recommendations for reform of the filing
12
system.
The report of the American Bar Association's Task Force on
the state of the filing system described the deficiencies of the
system revealed in the Task Force's survey of filing practices
8. At least a filing ceases to matter after five years, unless a proper continuation statement is filed within the statutorily prescribed six-month period.
See U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1990).
9. But Harry Sigman, a member of the Article Study and Revision Committees as well as a member of the Article 9 Filing System Advisory Committee,
has noted the filing officers' "urge to purge."
10. The members of the Task Force participating in the study discussed in
this Article were Mary Atkinson, John D. Berchild, Michael J. Brandt, Barbara
Brewer Clark, Marvin Gillock, Bruce Jacobi, Professor Robert M. Lloyd (Vice
Chair of the Task Force), Professor Ann Lousin, Professor Alemante G. Selassie, Jan Whitehead Swift, and Professor Peter A. Alces (Chair). See Report of
the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Filing System Task Force to the Permanent Editorial Board's Article 9 Study Committee (May 1, 1991) [hereinafter
Filing System Task Force], in PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9:
REPORT app. at 13, 15 (1992).
11. The Task Force survey evolved from a questionnaire developed by
Harry Sigman, a member of the Article 9 Study and Revision Committees. In
1991, the Task Force published the results in Survey of the U.C.C. Article Nine
FilingSystem and issued a Task Force Report based on that study. See id. at
16.
12. In 1992, an Advisory Committee, chaired by Jan Whitehead Swift, prepared a report entitled 19 Recommendationsfor Reform of the FilingSystem (on
file with author). The Advisory Committee included representatives of constituent interests in the Article 9 filing system.
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and review of the case law. 3 The Task Force Report focused on
the speed, accuracy, and cost of the system. A brief review of
these findings supports the argument pursued in subsequent
parts of this Article that we should carefully limit our ambitions
for the filing system.
A.

SPEED OF THE SYSTEM

Prudent secured creditors file financing statements against
the debtor's property well before the creditor funds the loan that
the collateral will secure.1 Besides providing the means to apprise all others with whom the debtor might negotiate of the
creditor's interest in the debtor's property, such anticipatory filing provides the creditor the means, before disbursing the loan
proceeds, to assure that its claim is first of record and will have
Article 9 priority.' 5 The prudent creditor also obtains a certified
search, in those jurisdictions where such a thing exists,' 6
although it is not clear that all interested parties have the same
7
understanding of what the certification assures.'
13. See Filing System Task Force, supra note 10, at 18-19 (describing scope
of Task Force study). For other, more comprehensive reviews of the case law,
see Hillman, supra note 2, and Julianna J. Zekan, The Name Game-Playingto
Win Under§ 9-402 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 365,
379, 433 (1990) (discussing judicial treatment of U.C.C. § 9-402).
14. There is, of course, no requirement that there be an obligation owed the
debtor by the creditor in order for there to be a filing: "A financing statement
may be filed before a security agreement is made or a security interest otherwise attaches." UC.C. § 9-402(1). But see id. § 9-404(1) ("[Wihenever there is
no outstanding secured obligation... the secured party must on written demand by the debtor send the debtor.., a termination statement to the effect
that he no longer claims a security interest under the financing statement,
which shall be identified by file number.").
15. See id. § 9-402(1) & cnt. 2.
16. Filing System Task Force, supra note 10, at 93-108 (providing state-bystate data regarding availability of certified searches).
17. The ABA Filing System Task Force Questionnaire that supported the
Task Force Survey asked respondents whether their state issued "certified"
searches and, if so, what the label "certified" signified:
Although thirty-four states reported that certified searches are
prepared, only ten states responded that a certified search verifies that
all statements on file in the debtor's name are included in the search
report. The significance of a certified search in other states is unclear,
with two [states] responding that the only significance of a certified
search is that it contains the official seal of the Secretary of State's
office, several reporting that certified searches are admissible in court,
and two states responding that a certified search indicates that it was
conducted by appropriate personnel.
Filing System Task Force, supra note 10, at 30-31.
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In the credit world, time is by definition money. Uncertainty that causes delay increases the cost of credit, and that
cost is passed on to debtors (to the extent that the market will
bear). At the margin, some debtors will be denied access to secured credit when the cost of credit increases.
So long, however, as a prospective secured party is able to
file a financing statement and then receive a search report showing it to be first of record by the time the secured creditor is
ready to fund the loan, the system works quickly enough. But if
a secured party-ready, willing, and able to fund a loan-is
delayed because a filing or search report is delayed, the system
does not work quickly enough.18 This is not to say that all secured creditors will wait for the system if a search report does
not come back by the time the secured creditor is ready to fund.
But if the secured party proceeds with the financing without
first obtaining the appropriate search report, and perhaps even
if the secured party later proceeds without a subsequent report
showing no intervening interests, 19 the system is not working as
designed-although it may be working despite itself.
Therefore, although the best filing system would be a system that could assure instantaneous filing and response, efforts
to reduce delay should be considered successful if they reduce
delay enough to stop frustrating the expectations of participants
in the secured credit system. At present, however, there is no
reason to believe that the delays in the current system have actually frustrated deals.20 To the extent that delay has not mattered because secured creditors have proceeded without the
18. See id. at 20 ("[Allthough a filed financing statement becomes effective
when filed, it may be some time later before it is indexed so that a search would
disclose it.").
19. A party may want to proceed with financing without obtaining any
search reports because of the costs such reports entail:
Although the charges made for searching and filing are minimal,
the inefficiencies of the present system impose enormous hidden costs
on both borrowers and lenders. Perhaps the most obvious of these is
the cost of search firms. In many jurisdictions, the response time on a
search request submitted to the central filing office is so long that lenders are forced to employ private search firms to make their searches.
For large transactions, this cost is insignificant, but for small transactions it can become important. The result in some cases is that
searches that should be made are, in fact, not. For example, some major commercial lenders when taking purchase money security interests
fail to search after filing to make sure their financing statement is
properly on file.
Peter A. Alces & Robert M. Lloyd, An Agenda for Reform of the Article 9 Filing
System, 44 OKLA. L. Ray. 99, 107 (1991).
20. Filing System Task Force, supra note 10, at 20.
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assurances that they should require (and could expect were the
system working better), the secured creditors' reliance on the
system should be reexamined: Do secured creditors really need
a faster system when they are willing to fuind a loan without the
assurances that a faster system would provide? If speed does
not matter as much as we thought it did, what is it about the
system that does matter? Posing the questions this way will
help assure that we do not design more of a filing system than
21
we need, at greater cost than is justified.
Article 9 nowhere specifies what a search report must contain,22 beyond the general statement in optional section 9-407
that upon a secured party's request
the filing officer shall issue his certificate showing whether there is on
file on the date and hour stated therein, any presently effective financ-

ing statement naming a particular debtor and any statement of assignment thereof and if there is, giving the date and hour of filing of each
such statement
and the names and addresses of each secured party
23
therein.

As a matter of course, secured parties contemplating substantial
loans will obtain a search report containing copies of all filing
statements at any filing office in which a financing statement
might have been filed against the debtor. 24 Counsel for the secured party will then peruse what may be a stack of financing
statements against the debtor's name or similar names to determine which financing statements trigger the need for a termination statement. When in any doubt (and even on occasion when
there is no real reason for doubt) the secured party will cause a
25
prior filing to be terminated.
Because counsel for the secured party will need to review
each prior filing in order to opine as to her client's priority, she
would be ill-advised to abdicate responsibility for review of prior
filings to a filing officer or search service that generates a search
report. So the filing system becomes a victim of its own comprehensiveness: The more information that search of the system
will yield, the more attorney time required to review search re21. Cost here means both the cost of implementing the system as well as
the costs imposed on secured creditors (and the secured credit system) for failing to comply with the requirements of the system.
22. Article 9 does describe the duties of a filing officer with regard to financing statements presented for filing. See U.C.C. § 9-403(4).
23. Id. § 9-407(2).
24. These reports are generally obtained through search services. See Alces & Lloyd, supra note 19, at 107 (noting that lenders often employ private
search firms to overcome delays in central filing offices).
25. See U.C.C. § 9-404 (describing termination statement).
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sults. In other words, the more that we ask of the system, the
more we slow it down and increase the risk that secured parties
will refuse to slow their dealmaking to discover whatever investigation of prior filings of record might reveal. Prudence, and
malpractice carriers, however, will settle for nothing less than
careful deliberation.
A number of possibilities exist for speeding up the system.
For instance, the law or regulations could provide greater certainty about what a search report must contain. By clearly stating what documents an attorney can obtain through a search
request, such reform would thereby determine the scope of the
attorney's responsibility to review documents. The attorney
would need to review only those documents pertinent to the priority determination.
The statute could be revised to remove ambiguity where
ambiguity requires counsel to take expensive and too often unnecessary precautions. For example, section 9-402(8) provides
containing "minor errors" that are not
that financing statements
"seriously misleading"26 may be effective despite their errors.
This provides the courts a means to do equity after the fact by
manipulating their interpretation of "seriously misleading," but
it also creates the type of uncertainty that a conscientious attorney will always resolve by assuming that a court will do that
equity at the expense of her client, and so she will take whatever
precautionary measures are available, at some cost.
Similarly, reform could speed the system by reducing the
role of subjective inquiries in determining the validity of filings.
For instance, section 9-401(2) provides that a deficient filing is
nonetheless effective "against any person who has knowledge of
the contents of such financing statement."2 7 This provision injects uncertainty into the system that generates cost by increasing the burden on potential creditors, who may have to establish
their lack of inquiry notice to survive the vicissitudes of a court's
26. Id. § 9-402(8) ("A financing statement substantially complying with the
requirements of this section is effective even though it contains minor errors
which are not seriously misleading."). Section 9-402(7) is also applicable to financing statements that have errors:
Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organization
its name, identity or corporate structure that a filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading, the filing is not effective to perfect
a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four
months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing statement is filed before the expiration of that time.
Id. § 9-402(7).
27. Id. § 9-401(2).
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post hoc "knowledge" calculus. 28 This is not to argue that the
harsh edges of the notice filing system should not, in the interest
of fairness and equity, be smoothed by inquiry notice concepts.
It is only to point out the costs, for the whole system, that essentially subjective exceptions may generate. Although five thousand attorneys will each review fifty filings for each of five
hundred transactions just to avoid the uncertainty of post hoc
"knowledge" determinations and never discover anything that
could remotely put them on inquiry, their time and fees are a
still may
drag on the secured credit system (and, most ironically,
29
not provide their clients the assurance they want).
B. AccuRAcY OF THE SYSTEM
Given the volume of paper generated by the filing system,
and the varying degrees of competence and sophistication of
those who feed the system, rely on the system, and maintain the
system, it should come as no surprise that there are inaccuracies. Virtually every constituency with an interest in the system
is in a position to undermine its efficacy by providing incomplete
or inadequate information.
Secured creditors completing a financing statement may fail
to identify properly the debtor, the collateral, and the address of
the debtor. Either intentionally or unintentionally, they may
even fail to provide sufficient information about themselves to
enable third parties to learn more about their claimed collateral
interest.3 0 Although it is reasonable to conclude that the secured creditors responsible for such inaccuracies should suffer
the consequences of their own carelessness, the benefits of that
predisposition must be balanced against the costs imposed on
28. The UCC defines "knowledge" in subjective terms: "A person 'knows' or
has 'knowledge' of a fact when he has actual knowledge of it." Id. § 1-201(25).
In a related context, regarding priority to chattel paper, a recent Permanent
Editorial Board Commentary made clear that the UCC's "knowledge" standard
does not impose a duty of inquiry on transferees of property encumbered by an
outstanding collateral interest. PERmANET EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE UCC,
PEB CoMMNrARY ON TE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: Co MErARY No. 8
FwAL DRAr 7-10 (1991) (addressing U.C.C. § 9-308).
29. An attorney can never know everything that his client has "knowledge"
of and thus can only look for whatever might trigger U.C.C. § 9-401(2).
30. Secured parties may try to disguise the essence of their financing for a
particular debtor. For example, to give third parties the impression that the
debtor is a better credit risk than third parties reviewing the filings records
may assume, finance company lenders participating with a bank in the provision of a line of credit may cause the financing statement to read "Bank of -,
for itself and as Agent," rather than disclosing the name of the finance company
even if the finance company is providing virtually all of the funding.
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careful secured creditors who will go to greater expense than we
might deem appropriate to avoid a post hoc conclusion that they
have been careless.3 1 Arguably, the only beneficiaries of a conclusion that the secured party was careless are the unsecured
creditors of the debtor-who realize a windfall when the putative security interest is avoided by the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. If this is the case, penalizing careless secured creditors
the benefits of penalizing careless secured creditors do not justify the systemic costs of requiring all conscientious secured parties to take extraordinary steps to preclude post hoc avoidance.
Filing office personnel, too, add to the problem of inaccuracies in the system. The ABA Survey and Task Force Report revealed that although most filing officers and search service
professionals are generally satisfied with the accuracy of filing
system searches, there are persistent problems with search accuracy that will likely occur so long as there is any human intervention in the system.3 2 The accuracy of filing system searches
is determined by the skill and care of those who index submitted
financing statements and those who perform the searches.
Turnover among filing office professionals as well as inconsistencies in the filing and search procedures within filing offices undermine the filing system's accuracy. Because there is such
intraoffice inconsistency, secured parties, their counsel, and
search services may have good reason to be uncertain about how
33
the system will respond to any given filing or search request.
31. This is similar to a point Professor Charles Mooney made in arguing
that the filing system should not have been extended to apply to lease interests
in personal property. "[Ain unperfected lessor may be exposed to greater costs
arising out of loss of its residual value than that incurred by an unperfected
secured party.... [T]he effects of nonperfection for lessors ... would be more
costly than for secured creditors because lessors rely more on the leased equipment." Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Owner.
ship" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing
Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA. L. Rxv. 683, 711, 713 (1988).
32. See Filing System Task Force, supra note 10, at 8; see also Dwight W.
Fawcett & Robert F. Hugi, Hidden Liens:A Trap for the Unwary, 106 BANKING
L.J. 212, 215 (1989) ("[A]s many as 20 percent of the search reports contain an
error of some kind.").
33. It should be only somewhat reassuring to secured creditors that there
may not be a good faith duty on a creditor to refile a financing statement once
the filing officer has accepted it but then revoked that acceptance and returned
the financing statement to the secured party. The filing is effective upon the
filing officer's receipt of it. U.C.C. § 9-403(1). A bankruptcy court has found
that a secured creditor has no good faith duty to refile when that acceptance is
revoked. In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 16 B.R. 132, 136 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1981).
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Interoffice inconsistencies worsen this problem. Within
each state that has local as well as central filing, the secured
party will confront potentially divergent practices among the local offices and between the local offices and the central office.
Secured creditors who undertake transactions in several states
will find little consistency among the different states' practices.
While there may be no reason why Maryland should care how
West Virginia maintains its filing system, the lack of consistency
and coordination among the states imposes costs on secured
transactions that are difficult to rationalize. It is not clear what
states' rights interest is vindicated by maintaining disparate
systems. Insofar as the personal property security law is state
law, however, it seems unlikely that federalization of the filing
system is imminent.
C.

THE REAL COST OF UNCERTAINTY
The two preceding subsections have suggested some of the
costs generated by delays and inaccuracies in the filing system.
So long as there is room for uncertainty in the system, as a matter of the legal, practical, or technological status quo, there will
be work for attorneys to do. In fact, however, many attorneys
know very little about the operation of the filing system and rely
on paralegals and search services to deal with filing offices. The
search services or filing offices provide attorneys with search reports and the attorneys then spend the time (and client money)
necessary to support an opinion regarding the priority of claims
to the debtor's assets.
Shortly after the ABA Study was completed, the ABA Task
Force briefly considered the role of attorneys in the filing system, particularly the attorneys' fees related to filing system issues in typical secured transactions. The percentage of
attorneys' fees related to filing issues in secured transactions is
determined by the nature of the debtor, the type of financing,
and the amount of the secured loan. If a debtor has many subsidiaries, or has collateral in many locations, filings in more filing offices may be necessary to assure the secured party's
priority. Similarly, all-assets financing, contemplating a security interest in various forms of collateral, generates more filing
system costs than would a purchase money loan in a single piece
of equipment. The amount of the financing also may have an
impact on the filing costs incurred by secured creditors.3 4
34. This would certainly be true in states that assess a tax on secured
transactions as part of the filing process, such as Tennessee, where a recording
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In her report to the ABA Task Force, Meredith Jackson,
then an associate working with the commercial law group of
Bingham, Dana & Gould, analyzed more than 100 legal bills
generated by the firm in its representation of lenders over a fiveyear period.3 5 Although the experience of other firms, with different groups of clients making different loans to different debtors, might differ from the Bingham, Dana, & Gould fee
pattern, 3 6 there is no reason to believe that the firm's figures are
significantly atypical.
Jackson divided the fee data into three categories: small
loans (less than $19 million), mid-size loans ($20-$74 million),
and large loans (greater than $75 million). She then "compared
the UCC filing costs associated with original financings, workouts, and ongoing maintenance including amendments, etc., and
costs for borrowers with two or less subsidiaries to those for borrowers with three or more subsidiaries."37 Finally, she separated the data related to attorneys' fees for loans to leasing
companies as presented in Table 1.38

tax of $0.115 per $100 of indebtedness is collected. TsN. CODE ANN. § 67-4409(b) (1994). The first $2000, however, is exempt. Id.
35. Letter from Meredith S. Jackson, Bingham, Dana & Gould, to Professor
Peter A. Alces, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and
Mary 1 (May 28, 1992) (on file with author).
36. See id. (As I stated at the ABA Spring Conference, I do not have any
basis to assert that these results are statistically significant, as I am unable to
evaluate in what respect our firm's handling of these filings might differ from
other firms' methods."). The particular clients served by a firm as prestigious
as Bingham, Dana & Gould may be more likely to fund large loans to debtors
with multiple subsidiaries in various jurisdictions-suggesting that the firm's
filing system-related fees would be higher than would be the case for loans
made to smaller debtors-but there is no reason that Bingham, Dana & Gould's
legal fees related to the filing system would be a higher percentage of the total
legal services bill than would be the case with smaller loans to smaller debtors.
The problem, of course, is that this important empirical work has not been
completed, nor even taken beyond the work of the ABA Task Force. The attorneys' fees associated with the filing system are crucial to the cost-benefit
calculus, and until those who would defend the filing system do empirical research that would controvert the data reported by Jackson, the case for the
filing system is uncertain.

37. Id.
38. Id. at 3.
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Table 1.

UCC Filing Costs as Percentageof
TransactionalCosts

Original Loan
Maintenance
Workout
0-2 Subsidiaries
3+ Subsidiaries
Leasing Cos. Loans

Size of Loan (in millions)
$20-$74 Under $19
Over $75
3.9%
4.7%
2.8%
1.8%
4.9%
3.6%
4.8%
6.2%
5.4%
4.1%
3.1%
2.2%
4.4%
5.1%
3.4%
15.4%
7.8%
6.4%

Average

3.6%

5.4%

4.2%

The figures in Table 1 are provocative, and become even
more so when the percentages are translated into dollars. Jackson reported that a typical fee for representing a secured creditor is $467,100, of which 5.52% (or more than $25,000) is
attributable to filing system cost. The lowest percentage was
under 1% ($40 of an $11,000 bill) and the highest was 38%
39
($6,935 of an $18,250 bill).

Whether those figures reflect what secured creditors would
have anticipated, and whether it is the province of Article 9 revision to make choices that will reduce attorneys' fees, it seems
clear that the figures reflected in Jackson's report are relevant
to legislative and regulatory reform of the filing system. The
39. Jackson reported the following figures for "Some Typical Transactions":
Transaction 1: $45 million credit-working capital (revolving credit loan
converting into term loan); six subsidiaries; collateral in 32 states; four-year
billing period; total bill: $467,100; UCC filings billing: $25,770 (5.52% of total
billings).
Transaction 2: $75 million credit-acquisition finance (term loan) and
working capital (revolving credit loan); 12 subsidiaries; collateral in 26 states;
four-year billing period; total bill: $637,250; UCC filings billing: $26,700
(4.19% of total billings).
Transaction3: $110 million workout (senior and sub debt restructuring);
five subsidiaries; collateral in 18 states; 15-month billing period; total bill:
$385,400; UCC filings billing: $18,660 (4.84% of total billings).
Transaction4: $12 million workout (restructuring of secured debt as one of
four senior secured parties); 14 subsidiaries; collateral in 37 states; 15-month
billing period; total bill: $242,750; UCC filings billing- $16,810 (6.92% of total
billings).
Transaction5: $4 million start-up company working capital financing; no
subsidiaries; collateral in four states; 13-month billing period; total bill: $9800;
UCC filings billing: $250 (2.6% of total billings). Id.
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figures are particularly pertinent to reform because they compel
us to ask what we are buying for nearly 5% in the form of attorneys' fees in some typical secured transactions (and more than
whether we are
15% in other types of secured transactions), 4and
°
paying too much for what we get in return.
The relationship between the legal costs generated by the
filing system and the dollar size of a particular financing transaction is not fixed: There is no reason to believe that the dollars
spent on attorney time for filing issues will increase as the
amount of the loan increases. Although there may well be some
relationship between the loan amount and the size of the debtor,
i.e., the debtor's number of subsidiaries and the locations of its
assets, the relationship between the percentage of the total legal
fee attributable to the 1filing system and the amount of the loan
4
need not be constant.
40. Five percent might not be too much if the filing system provided real
protection against the types of transactional risks that concern lenders, but it
would be an exorbitant amount to pay if the protections are substantially less
than they are designed to be due to incongruities in the system among the
states and breakdown or substantial impairment of the system within particular states. The issue remains one of determining what protection the system
needs to provide and what we should be willing to pay for that protection.
41. By contrast, a company that sells Article 9 filing system insurance is
currently working with several states and would sell creditors insurance at a
premium determined by reference to the amount of the secured loan:
Lien Priority Insurance performs all verifying, searching, analyzing search results, preparing financial statements (or comparable documentation), and filing in connection with every commercial loan
transaction. This results in our consolidating and standardizing the
capture and processing of data. The coverage includes all costs of defense. We work with lender, borrower, and their respective counsel to
complete the underwriting and issue a policy within the time frame for
closing.
The cost of coverage depends on the type of coverage that is selected. For all-inclusive coverage under the enclosed specimenwherein we would be responsible for determining where and under
what names to search, as well as what to file, where to file, under what
names to file, and prepare and make all required filings-, the premium would approximate 20 basis points, based on that portion of the
loan that is secured by personalty (the gross loan amount, less the
value of real estate, as determined by appraisal or title insurance).
Frequently, however, the lender or its legal counsel determines where
and under what names to file. In those situations, the cost usually is
between 2.5 and 6.5 basis points.
Please note that the premium is paid only once (like title insurance). Coverage also includes the systemic risk (i.e., losses resulting
from errors in each recordation system that is accessed).
Letter from Gary S. Petler, President, Lien Priority Insurance Agency, Inc., to
Peter A. Alces, Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of
William and Mary 1 (Nov. 9, 1994) (on file with author).
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What secured parties need, so far as the filing system is concerned, is the assurance that they will have access to the
debtor's assets (or at least the value thereof or the leverage provided by that access) in the event the debtor becomes unable (or
unwilling) to satisfy the obligation owed the secured party.
Thus, when a secured party invests legal fees in the filing system, it is buying insurance. 42 This insurance is not inexpensive.
Furthermore, even if the risks to which the secured party is exposed remain the same from one transaction to the next, i.e., the
amount of the loan, the premium paid in the form of legal fees
to items that are only tancan vary dramatically by reference
43
risk.
that
to
related
gentially
The point here is that those who would design a filing system must first come to terms with the cost of the current regime.
That calculus must take into account the multifarious factors
that determine the relationship between the cost of the current
system and the protection it affords. This subsection has tried to
suggest the nature of the costs involved. The next part of this
Article turns to the benefit side of the equation: What does the
current system buy at the current cost, and what should commercial transactors realistically expect a reformed system to
provide in the future, in light of obstacles to reform?
II. BENEFITS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
After the ABA Task Force presented its findings to the Article 9 Study Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code, the members of the Study Committee were asked, in an informal poll, to describe their understanding of the commercial reasons for the filing system.'
42. The secured party is certainly buying a portion of its counsel's malprac-

tice insurance, but that insurance does not protect the client against all filing
system risk. So long as counsel was not negligent in complying with the filing

system, the client would have no recourse against the attorney in the event that

a filing system malfunction, in the broader sense, impairs the client's collateral
position.
43. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (comparing the costs of legal

services and lien priority insurance in relation to size of loan).
44. The Study Committee members were asked to consider both the role of
and the need for filing.
I would be very grateful if you might be able to take a few minutes
to share with me your understanding of the commercial reasons for the
filing system (whether or not you agree with those reasons). If any
published materials reflect your understanding of the filing issues, it
would be very helpful if you could provide me the appropriate citations.
Particularly, I am concerned with focusing on the role of the filing system (i.e., to what extent it should be a commercial law "bulletin
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Several members of the Study Committee responded to the inquiry,4 5 and a few did so at some length, or at least in some
depth. 4 6 Some members described the filing system as a sort of
bulletin board for credit information concerning debtors. Others
focused on the way that the system's claim-staking function
serves as a form of fraud insurance for secured creditors. It is
important to assess these claims as to what the current filing
system does: Our conclusions should frame our ambitions for
what we want the filing system to do in the future. The sections
below address the different functions of the filing system identified by the respondents, and then compare what we know about
the system with reasonable aspirations for it.

A. Tim FLUNG

SYSTEM AS BULLETIN BOARD

The filing system arguably functions as a bulletin board,
providing credit information concerning debtors to interested
parties. The bulletin board paradigm, however, raises the questions: Does the filing system provide reliable credit information,
and, if it does, to whom is it provided?
A properly filed financing statement contains the names of
the debtor and the secured party, an address of the secured
party, a mailing address of the debtor, "and... a statement
indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral."4 7 A
party who searches the public filing records and discovers the
financing statement will then know enough to ask the right
questions: Is the named debtor in fact indebted to the secured
party? Is the secured party of record the lender or an agent of
the lender? Does the secured party's collateral interest in fact
board"), and in understanding why the contours and dynamics of particular commercial contexts may determine the necessity of filing.
Also, who would be victimized if the filing system does not work properly, or ifthere were no filing system at all? Finally, it would be worthwhile for me to develop a sense of attorney costs that the present
system entails.
Letter from Peter A. Alces, Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law,
The College of William and Mary, to members of the UCC Permanent Editorial
Board Article 9 Study Committee (June 11, 1991) (on file with author).
45. I received written responses from Howard Ruda, Of Counsel, Hahn &
Hessen; Bradley Y. Smith, Davis, Polk & Wardell; Edwin E. Smith, Bingham,
Dana & Gould; Steven L. Harris, Professor, University of Illinois College of Law
(Co-Reporter of Study Committee); Paul M. Shupack, Professor, Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; and Morris W. Macey, Macey, Wilensky, Cohen, Wittner & Kessler.
46. The following portions of this Article will not attribute particular arguments to particular respondents.
47. U.C.C. § 9-402(1).
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reach the assets described? 48 In short, a search reveals the potential interests of prior secured parties, at least in sufficient
form to provoke inquiry of the debtor and those prior secured
parties. Without access to filed financing statements, the potential creditor would have to rely on representations made by the
acquired through the creditor's own
debtor and information
49
investigation.
No careful counsel would suggest that the filing system is a
surrogate for a thorough credit investigation, but the filing system, even when it works imperfectly, 50 does provide information
about prior claims to the debtor's assets. There are, of course,
claims to the debtor's assets that would not be disclosed by filed
financing statements. 51 Still, the filing system need not provide
perfect and complete information to be a valuable source of information. It is from this perspective that the filing system as
"bulletin board" argument proceeds.
Proponents of the bulletin board view argue that the filing
system can also provide interested parties with useful information beyond that required by a minimal Article 9 financing statement. It provides creditors with the means to assert their
interest in the debtor's assets, even if that interest arises as a
matter of contract rather than by operation of Article 9. Edwin
E. Smith, a leading commercial attorney and a member of the
Article 9 Study and Revision Committees, explained:
48. Given the operation of § 9-203(1)(a) and § 9-402(1), the secured party
will have a perfected collateral in the debtor's assets properly described in both
the security agreement and the financing statement. If the descriptions are not
coextensive, the secured party will be perfected only to the extent of the more
limited of the two descriptions.
49. Professor Mooney points out that even with the Article 9 filing system,
a creditor interested in the debtor's title to particular property must still investigate fiurther:
[E]ven if a debtor is in possession of goods and no filings are found, an
interested person nevertheless must conduct further investigation to
determine the nature and existence of conflicting claims to the goods.
Such investigation is necessary even in order to determine the appropriate filing office to be searched. As a general matter, the Article 9
scheme extends only to whatever rights in the goods which the debtor
might have. The nature and extent of the debtor's rights must be divined from the debtor or other sources.
Mooney, supra note 31, at 749 (citations omitted).
50. The party searching the filing system who comes across an improperly
filed financing statement is on notice of the claim represented by that financing
statement and would be subordinate to that creditor's claim. U.C.C: § 9-401(2).
51. See, e.g., id. § 9-310 (providing that certain business liens "given by
statute or rule of law... take[ ] priority over a perfected security interest").
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I also seem to have little problem with the concept of the Article 9
filing system being used as a commercial "bulletin board". I have seen
this technique used on various occasions for negative pledge agreements and subordination agreements. In the case of a negative pledge
agreement, of course, it is in the interest of the creditor in whose favor
the negative pledge is granted to put other creditors on notice of the
existence of a negative pledge. In the case of a lender filing a subordination, it is in the interest of the debtor to provide comfort to a new
senior creditor extending credit to the debtor that the senior creditor
will in fact be senior. Although neither example fits squarely into the
original purposes of the Article 9 filing system, it seems to me that the
commercial "bulletin board" approach, by providing even additional information about the debtor than that required by the Article 9 filing
system, is useful. And, as the examples indicate, can benefit either52the
creditor or the debtor depending on the particular circumstances.

Even if secured creditors and debtors file nothing more than the
prototypical forms of financing statement, rather than the forms
of agreement that Smith discussed, the system will provide information that searchers may find useful beyond merely making
the priority determination. Those in the business of selling
money may rely on the filing system in order to find potential
customers in what can be a very competitive market, by discovering who has borrowed from whom and in order to acquire
what. There is no reason that inquisitive competitors could not
search the system to see what the business down the street or
across town has been up to lately.
The system also operates as a bulletin board when it provides just the information that those who designed the system
intended it to disclose: the relative priority of claims to assets of
particular debtors. It affords those interested in doing business
with the debtor on a credit basis invaluable information about
the debtor's ability to provide sufficient security, information
that can determine the terms upon which the creditor will make
credit available to the debtor.
Dean Douglas Baird was one of the first commentators to
reflect on the bulletin board potential and reality of the filing
system. 53 He concluded that the system does operate as a reliable and worthwhile bulletin board for the benefit of prospective
secured creditors, but does not effectively serve the interests of

52. Letter from Edwin E. Smith, Bingham, Dana & Gould, to Professor Peter A. Alces, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary
1-2 (July 31, 1991) (on file with author).

53. Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL S=U.

53 (1983).
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other transactors, such as unsecured creditors. Without a filing
system,5 4 Baird explained that potential secured creditors
would have to investigate [the debtor's] financial condition in greater
detail or charge a higher rate. Alternatively, [the secured creditor]
could shift (but not eliminate) the risk by forcing [the debtor] to post a
bond or by finding some third party to guarantee [the debtor's] ownership of the property he possesses.55

Baird started from the appropriate perspective, the relative
costs and benefits of abandoning the filing system,5 6 and concluded that the system is worth the candle:
The information that the Code provides secured creditors in its filing
system is exactly tailored to their need to know whether any claim they
make to a particular asset will have priority over any other. The filing
system is, in effect,
a place where secured creditors stake claims to the
debtor's property. 57

Baird is correct. The existence of the filing system is the best
argument for the filing system. If the system did not exist, there
58
would be no certain way to "stake a claim" to a debtor's assets.
The filing system is not merely evidence of a claim to particular
personal property, it is the sum and substance of that claim. So
the overwhelming benefit of the system is not the information it
provides, but the legal consequences that flow from the existence
of the information source. In Baird's words, "it makes the existence of property rights public in a clear and unambiguous
59

way."

This vision of the system may overstate its efficacy,60 and it
certainly fails to consider the consequences of the filing system's
54. Baird noted that many discussions of the Article 9 filing system "do not
address the question[ ] why there should be any filing system at all." Id. at 55.
55. Id. at 56. The type of guaranties Baird suggested are common,
although the secured party generally has the guarantor assume secondary liability for the principal obligation rather than guarantee the debtor's ownership.
This is essentially the same as having the guarantor guarantee ownership, but
is short of having an insurance company issue a title policy. Baird noted that a
creditor could "rely on a third party (similar to a title insurance company) to
provide information and to guarantee the information's accuracy." Id. at 58.
56. Id. at 60.
57. Id-at 62.
58. Baird recounted Professor Schwartz's and Dean Scott's application of a
"prospecting" theory to the filing system: "[Tlhese rules... allow a creditor who
has discovered a good credit risk (like a miner who has discovered a valuable
mineral deposit or an inventor who has hit upon a new idea) to have exclusive
rights to the financing opportunity." Id. at 63 (citing ALAN ScHWARTz & ROBERT
SCOTT, CoMmRcIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICES 594-97 (1982)).
59. Id. at 63.
60. Baird may have more confidence in the filing system than the ABA
Task Force Study would suggest is warranted. He asserts: "[A] creditor can
lend money to a debtor with confidence because he knows (by looking at the
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uncertainty. A secured party who has done nothing wrong or
careless may be a victim of the system if the system's deficiencies compromise its effectiveness at providing information. Because the filing system establishes priority, the cost of mistakes
is greater than it would be if the system were merely a source of
information. Furthermore, the cost of making sure there are no
mistakes may be greater even in cases where there are no mistakes. Thus, there are costs both when the system fails and
when it works, because it works so uncertainly, and the pros61
pects for making its operation more certain are not favorable.
The cost of the system when it does properly describe the priority of contestants to the debtor's assets is a cost that we have
come to ignore, but must not ignore, if we want to make an argument for a system in anything like its current form.
Baird also considered what information the system actually
needs to provide in order to effectively give notice of the possible
existence of prior security interests. His conclusion does not
support an elaborate bulletin board conception. The filing system, rather than rewarding inquiry with the full details of recorded security interests, merely "gives notice only of a duty to
inquire further"62 to determine if prior security interests encumber a debtor's assets. A filing system can perform this notice
function without providing much in the way of a bulletin board.
If, however, we want the filing system only to perform a notice
function, why should the statute require that a filed financing
statement contain much beyond the name of the secured party
and the debtor? One answer is that the system is a priority register, not just an information source, and we might not want to
make it too easy to gain a priority claim to assets. Another answer would be that we do trust the system to provide some information, to operate incidentally as a partial bulletin board, even
if we do not want to come to terms with the consequences of the
system's failure to provide the information effectively.

files) that no other existing creditor can claim an interest in the property superior to his own." Id. at 63 (citation omitted).
61. The political obstacles to reform are considerable: The filing system is
not particularly important to Secretaries of State, the public officials charged
with its maintenance. Indeed, there may be undesirable consequences for a
Secretary of State who endeavors to effect real reform of the system.
62. Baird, supra note 53, at 61. Baird did acknowledge that there is nothing in the UCC that requires the secured party of record to respond to thirdparty inquiries. Id. As a matter of fact, however, there may be good business
reason for creditors to cooperate with one another.
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On balance, it may be that we would be most comfortable
with a system that merely imparts inquiry notice. A pure inquiry notice system would provide less (and less specific) information than the current partial bulletin board system, but it
might cost less to maintain. Also, the less ambitious our design
of the system, the less that can go wrong with it. If the system
then fails to provide information that the market demands, the
market, I assume the law-and-economics types will point out,
will obtain the information some other way. 63 And it is not clear
that this other way will cost as much as the current system
costs. The work that must be done to support that determination has not yet been done in the various Article 9 contexts, nor
is it clear that it is even contemplated.
Wholly apart from Baird's conclusion that the system does
not really serve as a bulletin board to inform the commercial
choices of unsecured creditors is the question of whether adjustment of the system could enhance its utility by providing reliable information to unsecured creditors at a reasonable cost. It
may be that unsecured creditors do not use the current system
because the benefit of using it is not worth the cost. That is, the
information the system provides unsecured creditors is too incomplete to be of much use to unsecured creditors and obtaining
that incomplete information is too costly. The revisers of Article
9 could enhance the value of the information the system provides or reduce the cost of obtaining that information. That is,
they could do so in theory. But I doubt whether they could do so
in fact: Requiring candor and truthfulness in filings would
likely prove to be merely a hortatory admonition.
In any event, it is not clear how much unsecured creditors
really need financial information concerning the value of their
individual debtor's assets. Many if not most unsecured creditors
who sell on open account do so and then worry later if the debt is
not satisfied. The cost of the goods and services provided by unsecured creditors probably reflects, to the extent the market will
bear, some premium to cover bad debts. If it cost unsecured
creditors nothing to find out which accounts will be paid and
which will not before the fact, they would certainly take advantage of that information and price their goods or services accordingly. But even perfect information about a debtor's payment
history is only probative and not determinative of the debtor's
63. Edwin Smith's commentary on this Article notes alternative sources of
credit information. See Edwin E. Smith, Commentary on Abolish the Article 9
Filing System by ProfessorPeterAlces, 79 MAiN. L. Rav. 715, 718 (1995).
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payment in the future. So the price charged by an unsecured
creditor would reflect a certain nonpayment risk anyway, even if
unsecured creditors had perfect information about the payment
histories of all of their debtors.
Baird recognized that the filing system does not provide perfect information; it affords inquiry notice, notice of little value
unless you are prepared to pursue the inquiry. Insofar as it is
unclear that the system will provide unsecured creditors more
reason to inquire than they would have without first reviewing
the system, or will reduce the cost of such an inquiry, there is
not much information that the system has to offer unsecured
creditors. After all, by deciding not to require collateral, the unsecured creditor is agreeing to be subordinate to later-in-time
perfected secured parties. So even if the unsecured creditor
later events could
were to learn something from the system,
64
render the most perfect information moot.
Using the filing system would also impose costs on the unsecured creditor, i.e., the cost of discovering where to search the
filing records, actually searching those records, and then distilling from those records legal and financial information pertinent
to the unsecured creditor's credit decision. Insofar as the creditor contemplating secured status 6 5 or the potential purchaser of
the debtor's assets 66 runs the risk of obtaining actual knowledge
of a misplaced filing, the unsecured creditor may67be even worse
off for having performed a search of the system.
It is also true that many unsecured creditors would have no
way to search a filing system before they could assert a claim
against the debtor's assets. Nonconsensual creditors, those with
claims arising from the debtor's tortious activity, are not within
the contemplation of the notice function of the filing system. But
64. Baird noted that, although the filing system is not designed to serve the
interests of unsecured creditors, it is of some use to them. Baird, supra note 53,
at 61-62. He concluded that those who have argued in favor of abolishing the
system have done so because they have failed to appreciate that the system is
meant to serve the interests of secured, not unsecured, creditors. Id. at 62 (citing Allison Dunham, Inventory andAccounts Receivable Financing,62 HAnv. L.
REv. 588 (1949)).

65. Or, the unsecured creditor who later takes a judicial lien.
66. The buyer of equipment would likely not be a buyer in the ordinary
course of business and so would take subject to any security interest, even an
unperfected security interest, of which that buyer has knowledge. U.C.C. § 9-

301(1)(c).
67. See id. § 9-401(2) (providing that deficient filings are nonetheless effective "against any person who has knowledge of the contents of such financing
statement").
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some consensual creditors, the less sophisticated perhaps, might
not even know that there is an Article 9 filing system, and even
a larger group of creditors would not appreciate the consequences of the notice filing system in any event.
Yet the most prominent reason why unsecured creditors
may as well ignore the Article 9 filing system is the fact that
federal bankruptcy law effectively gives unsecured creditors a
lien against the debtor's assets when they most need one: when
the debtor is in bankruptcy. As Professor White has demonoccurs in
strated, a great deal of Article 9 filing system action
68
regime.
current
the
under
court
the bankruptcy
For the reasons discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, it is
not difficult to appreciate why the filing, system does not serve
an informational need of unsecured creditors. The question remains, then, whether the informational benefits that the system
provides secured creditors justify the associated costs it imposes
on them.
The current system, so far as secured creditors are concerned, provides a far from perfect bulletin board. Apart from
the priority ordering function, the filing system is a relatively
convenient, if not very reliable, place to put information that you
would like other potential or existing 69 secured parties to acquire. There is, however, no guaranty that anyone will actually
learn what you want them to learn and no fling system sanction
imposed for a failure to heed the bulletin board information.
Furthermore, it may be that a cost of enhancing the bulletin
board function is disruption of the priority function of the filing
system. The more we ask of the system the greater the cost in
cluttering the system-more paper, more attorney time going
through it, more opportunity for error. At some point, it could be
that the cost of providing certain information exceeds the commercial benefits of providing it. At least it would seem that we
should have a better sense of the costs and benefits of the status
quo before we decide to increase the burdens on the system. Do
we know enough to say with any confidence that the benefits of
relying on the system to provide broader credit information
would exceed the costs of such a model? That is unlikely, insofar
as we have yet to come to terms with the costs of the current
system in each of the various secured credit contexts. We have
68. See White, supra note 3, at 830-41.
69. See U.C.C. § 9-312(4)-(5) (providing certain later purchase money secured parties priority over prior secured parties of record).
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continued to assume the efficacy, the inevitability of the system;
we have yet to establish the system's efficacy.

B. THE

FnLNG SYSTEM AS FRAUD INSURANCE

Many commentators argue that the filing system's primary
purpose is to provide creditors with insurance against the risk
that a debtor will impose secret liens on its assets to frustrate
the claims of creditors. 70 There are two principal ways in which
this fraudulent "secret lien" problem might arise. The first form
involves a conspiracy between a debtor and a creditor to deceive
the debtor's other creditors. As Professor Paul Shupack 7 l and
Morris Macey have noted,7 2 the filing system establishes, with
some certainty, "the earliest possible date for perfection of the
interest of the secured party."73 Without the date certainty that
the filing system provides, an unscrupulous debtor and creditor
could, in some states, defraud earlier lien creditors. For instance, Mr. Macey noted that, prior to the enactment of Article 9
in Georgia, a bill of sale to secure debt was effective to perfect a
collateral interest in personal property and did not require filing
for perfection. 74 A debtor and creditor could defraud earlier lien
creditors by backdating a bill of sale that created a security interest in the creditor's favor.
The Article 9 system is not, however, the only conceivable
means to prevent such fraud. For instance, this type of fraud
might be avoided by requiring some official notation on an official record stating the date on which a debtor granted a collateral interest in particular property. 7 5 Such a device would not
70. See, e.g., David M. Phillips, Flawed Perfection:From Possession to Filing Under Article 9 (pts. 1 & 2), 59 B.U. L. REv. 1, 209 (1979) (advocating

greater reliance on perfection through filing that serves as insurance to many
creditors rather than perfection through possession).
71. Letter from Paul M. Shupack, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, Yeshiva University, to Professor Peter Alces, Marshall-Wythe
School of Law, The College of William and Mary 1-2 (July 29, 1991) (on file with
author).

72. Letter from Morris W. Macey, Macey, Wilensky, Cohen, Wittner &
Kessler, to Professor Peter A. Alces, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary 1 (July 2, 1991) (on file with author).
73. Letter from Paul M. Shupack to Professor Peter Alces, supra note 71, at
1.
74. Letter from Morris W. Macey to Professor Peter A. Alces, supranote 72,
at 1.
75. This type of record would be desirable in any event given the timing
issues that may arise in Article 9 litigation-concerning future advances, afteracquired property, and purchase money security interests-and in subsequent
bankruptcy proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548 (1988) (covering preferences
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be foolproof, but it might close enough of the fraudulent-dating
loophole to justify its adoption. The test is whether the device
buys enough protection at sufficient savings over the status quo
to reduce the real cost of secured lending.
The filing system also prevents pure debtor fraud-the kind
that the debtor commits without the help of a collusive creditor
by granting successive collateral interests in the same property
without notifying each secured party of the (prior) adverse
claimants. This is the true secret lien problem and, for some, it
is the raison d'etre of the filing system. If the filing system did
not provide an effective means to avoid the risk of pure debtor
fraud, there might not be any remaining viable argument in
favor of the filing system. So if there is to be a filing system, it
must reduce, if not eliminate entirely, this fraud risk.7 6
There are two interrelated elements to the secret lien fraud
risk: Some claims against the debtor's property may remain "secret" but effective notwithstanding the Article 9 filing system,
and enterprising debtors who find their schemes frustrated by
Article 9 may well find other means to defraud a secured
creditor.
Article 9 gives effect to a number of ostensibly "secret" liens.
For instance, section 9-310 recognizes the priority of certain
non-Article 9 collateral interests arising by operation of state
law so long as the liens are possessory. 7 7 Given the possession
requirement, these potentially secret liens do not pose a serious
threat to the integrity of the filing system. 78 Also, counsel for
secured lenders spend time reviewing the available compendia
of non-uniform state liens prior to closing secured loans so that
their creditor clients can try to obtain necessary subordination
agreements, or at least so that counsel's closing opinion letter
can except assets within the scope of the secret liens.
Professor Lynn LoPucki has developed a catalog of ten scenarios in which the current filing system would not reveal an
effective prior claim to the debtor's assets to even a very diligent
79
secured party-searcher of the filing records:
and fraudulent transfers). See generally PTR A.ALcES, THE LAW OF FRAUDUchs. 5-6 (1989 & Supp. 1994) (describing statutory and

LENT TRANSACTIONS,

common law responses to various types of fraudulent dispositions).
76. There may be so many other debtor-fraud risks that the risk of pure
debtor fraud is relatively insignificant.

77. U.C.C. § 9-310.

78. Ostensible ownership issues would not be implicated because the collateral interests recognized in U.C.C. § 9-310 are possessory.
79. LoPucki, supra note 6, at 7-9.
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Filings against the debtor's predecessor in title;8 0
Defective filings; 8 '
Filings not yet appearing of record;8 2
Filings in former name of debtor;8 3
Effective filings in other jurisdictions; 8 4
Filings against
mobile goods prior to debtor's
85
relocation;
7. Local filings that remain effective after debtor
86
relocates;
8. Filings relating
to goods whose characterization has
87
changed;
9. Automatic perfection contexts;8 8 and
10. Filings that diligent search would not reveal but which
courts later determine a diligent search should have
89
revealed.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

There are, as well, claims to assets that are effective by operation of some other, non-Article 9 filing system, e.g., tax liens and
judgments. 90
It is difficult to tell whether reform of the system could
avoid the problems associated with these hidden (if not secret)
interests. Whether we should even attempt to eliminate all such
hidden interests should be a matter of cost/benefit analysis:
Recognizing that no system will be airtight, what are the marginal costs of getting closer to a vacuum compared with the marginal benefits of each incremental step? Before we can even
compose that equation, we must frame our reasonable aspirations for the system.
80. See id. at 7 & n.5 (citing U.C.C. § 9-402(7) & cmt. 8; Jay L. Westbrook,
Glitch:Section 9-402(7) and the U.C.C. Revision Process, 53 GEO. WASH. L. Rv.
408 (1984)).

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 7 (citing U.C.C. § 9-403(1)).
Id. (citing Filing System Task Force, supra note 10, at 57-63).
Id. (citing Westbrook, supra note 80).
Id. at 8 (citing U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d)).
Id. (citing U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(e)).
Id. (citing U.C.C. § 9-401(3)).

87.

Id.

88. Id. at 8-9; see also Phillips, supra note 70 (advocating more structured
filing system to avoid problems inherent in perfection through possession).
89. LoPucki, supra note 6, at 9 & n.19 (citing Zekan, supra note 13).
90. See Baird, supra note 53, at 59 n.18.
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WHAT'S A FILING SYSTEM TO

Do?

Commentators have wondered for some time just what it is
we want the filing system to achieve. Baird concluded that we
want the system to provide a place to stake claims to assets. 9 1
Other commentators focus on debtor (and secured party) fraud
problems. 92 Still others focus on the bulletin board benefits the
filing system provides. 93 Although it may be that true consensus about the role of the filing system has yet to be realized,
there does seem to be general agreement that the system enhances the value of a creditor's collateral interest in the debtor's
assets. 94 Without the certainty of priority (at whatever level)
that the system provides, secured creditors would have to charge
a higher interest rate to compensate themselves for the increased risk to which they would be exposed if there were no
similarly certain means to assure priority. This argument, however, depends on the assumption that the incremental benefit
provided by the system is greater than the cost of providing that
benefit.
So, to assess the value of the current filing system, it is necessary to measure the incremental benefit and to appreciate the
true costs. The thesis of this Article is that the commentators
who have heretofore extolled, or at least assumed, the benefits of
the current filing system have failed to come to terms with
either the costs of the system or the incremental benefits it provides. Furthermore, proponents of reform of the filing systemand all of Article 9, for that matter-compound the problem of
inadequate cost/benefit analysis by proposing agenda that do not
properly consider the real and probably insurmountable 95 obstacles to reform. But it is only after careful cost/benefit analysis
91. Id. at 63.
92. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (discussing arguments
that date certainty from filing system prevents various types of fraud).
93. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 31-37 (discussing benefits of "bulletin
board" approach to Article 9 filings); supra note 52 and accompanying text
(quoting letter from Edwin E. Smith).
94. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 175 (explaining that the filing
system provides secured parties with inexpensive means to perfect collateral
interests, enabling secured parties to charge lower interest rates than if they
lacked certainty about priority of their claims). The authors do note, however,
that Ithe Code assumes that [the benefit provided by the filing system] outweighs the costs imposed upon secured parties by the requirement that they

take possession or file." Id.

95. The term "insurmountable" is used here in an economic sense: If the
benefits of overcoming obstacles to reform are less than the costs of achieving

reform, the obstacles are insurmountable for all intents and purposes.
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that the important work on an alternative to the current filing
system should properly proceed.
Contemporary apologists for the filing system have urged
its expansion: They advocate adjusting the filing system so that
it would apply to more contexts than those currently contemplated by Article 9. Baird and Jackson would impose a filing
requirement in lease transactions to respond to an ostensible
ownership problem 9 6 that Professor Mooney has proven does not
exist.97 Professor LoPucki recognizes that the current system is
not only incomplete, but fatally defective, 98 and yet he proposes
that the design of a revised system be enhanced so that searchers could obtain more-and more reliable-information from a
review of filings. 9 9
These arguments for expansion apparently fail to recognize
that by increasing the burden we impose on the system we
would make it less reliable. The ABA Task Force Report demonstrates that many systemic deficiencies are a product of the volume of information that the system accumulates. If the current
system is collapsing of its own weight, how do we improve it by
compounding the problems that currently plague it? Furthermore, the proposals for expansion of the system do not offer evidence, empirical or otherwise, that secured creditors cannot and
do not now obtain the information that the proposed enhancements would provide. Nor do they demonstrate that the costs
saved by having the system provide the information are more
than the increased costs imposed on the system, and therefore
on secured credit, by having the system provide the information
that concerned creditors now seem to be able to discover (to their
satisfaction) without the help of the filing system.
Professor LoPucki's proposal does make clear that the enhanced role he perceives for the system would only evolve as the
system takes greater advantage of technological innovation. 10 0
He notes that there is substantial room for improvement given
the relative lack of sophistication in the current system. He is
right about the deficiencies of the status quo, but he fails to recognize that the very same factors that have prevented the sys96. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 186-90 (arguing that filing lease
transactions would avoid potential conflicts from third-party interests in personal property).
97. See Mooney, supra note 31.
98. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 6-15 (arguing that the current system is
too cumbersome and unreliable to allow complete searches).
99. Id. at 15-31.
100. Id.
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tem from keeping up with the ostensible information needs of
secured creditors under the current law will also prevent the
system from satisfying secured creditors' desires for the foreseeable future. To oversimplify, there are two principal impediments: a lack of funds and a lack of incentive. The case has
simply not been made to filing system operators that they have
anything to gain from improving the system. Keep in mind that
the Maryland Secretary of State has no reason to care about how
her West Virginia counterpart searches for and files financing
statements.
It is from this pessimistic perspective that my conception of
a filing system emerges. The system should do no more than we
are absolutely certain it could do well, namely, insuring a secured party by providing a memorandum of collateral interest
that clearly affords the secured party the priority rights provided by Article 9. I am not convinced that the memorandum
need be published or notorious so long as it exists and the secured party is assuredthe first-in-time priority that is the premise of Article 9. The next part of this Article describes a filing
regime that could effectively serve the secured party's (and the
secured credit system's) need for this type of credit insurance
that the current system is designed-but fails-to provide.
Il.

THE STATE ASSURANCE MODEL

A. A PLACE TO START
Although it is evident that secured creditors look to the filing system to stake claims to assets of their debtors, the extent
to which they actually rely on the system is uncertain, and likely
varies from one creditor and one transaction to the next. Bradley Smith, a member of the Article 9 Study Committee, explained that in his "own practice, which focuses on big ticket
transactions and large companies, the functioning of the filing
system is of relatively limited importance. My clients tend to
rely on other due diligence measures to a greater extent."10 1 If
that observation reflects the experience of similarly situated
commercial counsel, it would be worthwhile to take that lack of
101. Letter from Bradley Y. Smith, Davis Polk & Wardwell, to Professor Peter A. Alces, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary 1
(July 12, 1991) (on file with author). It may be that not all counsel appreciate,
as Mr. Smith does, the limited efficacy of the current system. To the extent
people think it works more reliably than it actually does (and they are likely to
think so because almost all loans are repaid) they are likely to miscalculate its
value and be comfortable paying for it at the current rate.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:679

reliance on the system into account when deciding what alternative to the status quo might adequately serve commercial interests. How much insurance in the form provided by the filing
system do creditors such as those represented by Smith need to
buy, and how much should they have to pay for it?
So my imagination of a world without a filing system begins
with a very limited view of the benefits provided by the system,
a view informed by the scope, efficacy, and commercial value of
the current system. Admittedly, I paint my picture of the filing
system landscape with a broad brush. My arguments in favor of
abolishing the current system and starting all over again-without assuming either the need for or the effectiveness of the current system-proceed from what may be insufficient
discrimination among the various secured transaction contexts.
It may well be that the present filing system works better in
some settings and not so well in others (determined by reference
to the type and value of the collateral and the sophistication of
the creditors and debtors as well). Nonetheless, I would impose
the burden on those arguing in favor of the present filing regime
to provide empirical evidence of its efficacy. That is, those who
would defend a filing requirement must establish that the secured credit system is more efficient with that requirement than
without it. To the extent that they can demonstrate in particular contexts that a filing requirement works (and not merely because it does not often matter that it fails), a revised Article 9
should, through statute and regulation, provide for its application to those contexts. 10 2 Even in those limited contexts, however, advocates of a filing system must demonstrate that
imposition of a public notice requirement is the least expensive,
most efficient means to the desired end.
From these premises, from this limited filing theory, an alternative emerges.

102. This type of inquiry into the extent that a filing requirement works in
particular situations distinguishes Mooney's article in response to Baird and
Jackson's ostensible ownership thesis. See Mooney, supra note 31 (critiquing
proposals to extend filing requirement to leases); Baird & Jackson, supra note 5
(arguing for extending Article 9 notification rules to leases and other bailments). In fact, Mooney's argument is so convincing that it would seem he has
already made the case for excepting purchase money security interests in
equipment (the Article 9 analogue of lease transactions) from the Article 9 filing
requirement. I am indebted to Professor David Frisch for recognizing this consequence of the Mooney critique.
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SKETCH OF THE STATE FILING ASSURANCE MODEL

The central purpose of Article 9 filing is to allow creditors to
stake their place in the priority line. Perversely, the system allows creditors to stake their claims but requires them to spend a
great deal of money to learn if their claims might be valid. Creditors' counsel must sift through piles of documents to produce
uncertain opinions on priority. A new filing system should focus
on Article 9's claim-staking insurance function but provide creditors with an efficient, inexpensive means to verify the validity
of their security interests. One easy way to realize this goal
would be to provide state filing offices the power to determine
priority.
Under the current Article 9 filing and search systems, the
different filing offices accept financing statements, put them into
the system, and provide access to the records the filings create.
The efficacy of the system, as the preceding parts of this Article
have demonstrated, depends on the system's providing a certain
way for secured creditors to assert their claims to the debtor's
assets. It is the filing offices that control the information that
determines the priority of an asserted claim. But the filing office
in no way makes the determination that a particular creditor
has a prior claim. The filing offices only provide access to the
information from which that conclusion might be inferred.
Many of those who have been concerned with the operation
of the filing system have argued that the filing offices, and individual filing officers, should be mere conduits for financing statements: They should accept whatever financing statements
creditors present to them so long as the creditors pay the required fee. They should then let the courts and counsel sort out
priority claims after the fact. There is a good deal to commend
this view. Filing office staffs usually do not have the legal training to exercise the type of judgment that is required to determine Article 9 priority. A fact of bureaucratic life is that there is
significant turnover in filing offices, where even the best paid
administrators may not command the salaries that would attract people to dedicate their professional lives to the sweet science of Article 9 financing statements.
Consider, however, what would happen to the cost of the filing system if the filing offices issued assurances that the secured
party filing a financing statement had a particular priority claim
to the debtor's assets. That is, would the costs of the current
system be reduced without too great a loss of benefit if filing offices provided creditors the same assurance that a private in-
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surer could provide by issuing something like credit insurance?
Filing offices would certainly have to increase the fees they
charge to reflect the insurance cost of providing such priority assurances. But this reform would also eliminate a substantial
portion of the attorneys' fee cost generated by the current system. 10 3 Secured creditors' counsel would have no reason to issue
a priority opinion because the assurance of the filing office would
determine priority.
If filing offices insured creditors against priority risk, then
the costs of the system's malfunction would be imposed on the
actors in the best position to maintain the system: the public
filing offices. Shifting the risk of priority loss would provide incentive to develop and maintain coherent practices to make the
priority determination more certain. It would, in sum, cause the
state filing offices to internalize what are now externalities.
Every dollar in claims not paid out of the state insurance fund
would be money that the state could keep, so there would be real
compensation for assuring the integrity of the system.
While requiring filing offices to make priority determinations would entail that filing officers exercise legal judgment,
due to the determinative nature of that judgment, it should cost
secured creditors less than what they currently pay when buying uncertain priority opinions from attorneys. The uncertainty
of the present system costs money; the state assurance filing
system would eliminate that uncertainty. Once counsel no
longer opines as to priority, counsel should be satisfied as long
as the filing officer issues the priority assurance. And if the ifiing officers require that the collateral description be printed on
orange paper, creditors' counsel need only comply; she need not
reason why. Counsel will be comfortable with the filing office's
judgment, because the secured creditor is protected whether the
filing office erred in its priority judgment or not.
Such a system would also avoid most of the wasteful Article
04
9 litigation over perfection described by Professor White.'
Outside of the bankruptcy context, an unperfected secured party
has priority over an unsecured creditor. 10 5 In the bankruptcy
context, however, if a creditor loses perfected status, then the
creditor also loses secured status.' 0 6 This naturally creates an
103. The attorney for the creditor would still prepare the financing
statement.
104. See White, supra note 3 (discussing the cost of unnecessary filings and
litigation regarding secured creditors' perfection).
105. U.C.C. § 9-301(1).
106. The Bankruptcy Code provides that:

1995]

ABOLISH FILING

incentive for trustees in bankruptcy to litigate the issue of
perfection so as to create a windfall for the unsecured creditors.
Under the regime proposed here, however, so long as the secured party receives the dated certificate of priority from the filing office, the secured creditor has nothing to fear from the
trustee in bankruptcy: The security interest will, necessarily, be
perfected. This result would naturally decrease the trustees' incentive for litigation. The state filing officer's assurance would
also determine the date of perfection for purposes of preference
07
and fraudulent transfer inquiries in bankruptcy.'
Certainty of perfection in this context would have the added
benefit of reducing attorneys' fees related to preparation of financing statements. Again, creditor's counsel would no longer
have to worry whether a bankruptcy judge could laterdetermine
that the creditor's collateral interest is unperfected: The issuance of the priority certificate would foreclose the perfection inquiry. As the requirements for and success of perfection would
be clearer under the state assurance filing model, attorneys
could prepare filing documents with less worry and more
efficiency.
The state filing assurance system would also prevent fraud,
much as the current system does. By providing a certain date
for perfection, it would prevent debtors and creditors from colluding to manufacture the priority of a secured party to defraud
later creditors. 0 8s The state filing assurance alternative would
also respond to the other type of fraud risk, the true "secret lien"
risk that the debtor will fail to disclose to one potential secured
party the existence of a competing security interest. The current filing system prevents this sort of fraud by ensuring that a
creditor considering the extension of secured credit need not rely
on the debtor to disclose existing collateral interests. If the state
filing office issues a priority certificate, based on the filing of(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case,
and without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor,
the rights and powers of...
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with
respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor
on a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether
or not such creditor exists.
11 U.S.C. § 544 (1988).
107. See id. §§ 547-48 (establishing 90-day and one-year limitations
periods).
108. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (discussing possible
fraud in absence of certain dates for perfection).
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ficer's review of the records, a creditor would not have to rely on
the debtor's representation any more than the creditor would
have to rely on the debtor under the current regime.
Furthermore, the state filing assurance model could reduce
the risk of secret liens by requiring that debtors disclose claims
to the debtor's assets as part of the priority certificate process.
The debtor would also be required to disclose those events that
impair the priority of a filed financing statement under the current law. 10 9 In addition, it might well prove worthwhile for
states to coordinate their practices to develop a system of interstate checks to aid verification when a debtor's business crosses
state lines. 110 This disclosure obligation could be continuing, so
that creditors with "filings of record" (or who otherwise subscribe to the system) would receive pertinent notices"-1 until
they file a termination statement. 1 2 Of course, creditors can
currently provide in loan covenants that debtors make such disclosures at the inception of and during the course of the credit
impose criminal sanctions on
relationship. But the state could
13
individuals for false swearing.
Although a private insurance (rather than a state filing assurance) alternative to the current system might be an improvement over the status quo, one real shortcoming of that type of
reform is that it would not effect dramatic improvement of the
system itself. 1 4 Private insurers would continue to insure cred109. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text (outlining scenarios in
which the current filing system fails to reveal effective prior claims).
110. Interstate cooperation in verifying claims would reduce the risk of secret liens in several of the 10 scenarios that Professor LoPucki identified as
posing the danger of secret liens. See supranotes 86-87 and accompanying text
(noting risks when filings appear in other jurisdictions and when filings are
made against mobile goods before debtor's relocation).
111. Notices would issue, for example, when the debtor reports a change of
name, change of location, change of location of collateral, or change in corporate
structure. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-401 (stating that a proper filing remains effective
even though the debtor's location or the location of the collateral subsequently
changes).
112. An ongoing disclosure obligation might provide states with an opportunity to share filing system information as a means to check a debtor's veracity.
This would not be unlike the states' reciprocity systems in the case of drivers'
licenses.
113. See Baird, supra note 53, at 61 ("If the legal system needs to be
changed to give general creditors more protection, additional civil and criminal
penalties for debtor misbehavior seem more appropriate than requiring more
information in the filing system.") (citing Jeffrey Helman, Ostensible Ownership
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 83 COM. L.J. 25, 31 (1978)).
114. A state assurance system would best operate as the intermediate step
toward privatization of filing system insurance. Were the states to fix certainly
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itors against the uncertainties still inherent to the system.
Although private insurance would rationalize how creditors pay
for uncertainty, it would not alter the fact that uncertainty costs
money.
Individual states' adoption of the state filing assurance alternative, by contrast, would immediately remove uncertainty
from the system, reducing the cost of secured credit. Furthermore, because the state would be selling priority certificates
rather than merely providing access to its records, the state
could make a good deal of money from the business and still
charge less than the filing system attorneys' fees under the status quo. The filing fee would represent the aggregation of risk of
loss because of filing system error rather than an amount determined by private counsel's review of sometimes ambiguous
records.
Further enhancing its chances for enactment, a revised Article 9 that settles with certainty the perfection issue in the
bankruptcy context would likely win the support of the large institutional creditors. The state assurance filing model guarantees perfection and thereby destroys the danger that these
creditors now face of losing their secured status because a
trustee in bankruptcy prevails upon a court to defeat the creditors' perfected status.
For those who favor the bulletin board model and argue that
the filing system is a source of valuable (albeit expensive) information beyond the perfection issue, there would be no reason
that filing offices could not continue to sell access to their files.
But once the priority certificate issues, further review of the files
would not divest a collateral interest. The certificate would establish both perfection and priority absolutely.
Finally, to ensure that the state assurance system described
1: 15
here in fact provides what the market demands and no more,
the system would be voluntary, an option for creditors willing to
pay for the certainty the assurance provides. A creditor unwilling to pay for perfection and priority assurance could simply file
a financing statement and pay only a filing fee, not an assurance
"premium." Provision of the assurance as an alternative rather
creditors' perfected status and priority, private insurers could less expensively
insure creditor-policy holder's positions because the perfection and priority determinations would be made at the initiation of the credit, not post hoc, in the
bankruptcy context. The insurer would not have to charge a premium to reflect
the risk of post hoc unperfection.
115. See supra part lIA (discussing need to frame the filing system's goals
in light of the credit system's actual needs).
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than requiring all creditors to pay for protection some of them
may not want vindicates market integrity: Real cost savings are
accomplished by spreading risk, but only when the transactor
determines that it is more efficient to spread the risk rather
than, effectively, to self-insure.
CONCLUSION
This Article has described the state of the current Article 9
filing system in terms of its costs and benefits. It has focused
attention on an element of cost that has been largely ignored,
attorneys' fees. It has also suggested that the cost of reforming
the current system, given the substantial political obstacles to
reform, would be greater than current advocates of reform might
appreciate. The Article has also endeavored to distill the benefits provided by the current filing system, and has argued that
the benefits are not what they may seem to be. The cost of the
system can only be understood in terms of the very limited benefits the system provides.
Ultimately, this Article argues that the current system fixes
a butterfly upon a wheel, expends too much to realize too little.
All of the significant benefits provided by the current system
could be provided at far less cost if the incentive for maintaining
the system were imposed on the entities in the best position to
improve the system: state filing offices. State coffers would benefit from the cost savings enjoyed by the resulting reduction in
filing system uncertainty and attorneys' fees. That should not
be a hard sell with state legislatures and would encourage,
rather than frustrate, states' adoption of a revised Article 9.

